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It has been said that ethno-national identity, despite being ‘psychological’ in constitution, is 
territorialised in place. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to conceive of any identity, particularly 
one that is ethno-national in variety, which does not contain a strong territorial underpinning. 
Yet refugees that are driven out from their homeland on account of their ethno-national 
identity are typically considered to constitute a de-territorialised group. Halting the analysis 
there, however, is problematic, since refugees do not necessarily lose a sense of ethno-
national identity consciousness on account of being de-territorialised. Nor would it be sensible 
to assume that ethno-national identity can persist without a territorial basis. Rather what this 
paper contends is that de-territorialised refugees, upon arrival into their host societies, 
endeavour to ‘re-territorialise’ their persecuted identity and that such a process will likely 
prompt the rise of ethno-national conflict. This claim will be demonstrated with reference to 
the Sikhs of Punjab. 
 
 
Re-territorialisation of persecuted identity 
It is this author’s contention that refugee1 populations grow (more) conscious of that 
aspect of their identity which had been persecuted in their departed homeland. After 
arriving into their host societies, the de-territorialised refugees endeavour to re-
                                                
1 A refugee is, per the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees), any person, who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his[her] origin’ (quoted in Gallagher 1989, 580). 
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territorialise their persecuted identity.2 Indeed, such a process is integral to the very 
survival of this identity among the group, similar to how an uprooted plant must be 
replanted immediately or else it will inevitably wither away and die. The manner in 
which refugee persecuted identity is re-territorialised, however, is not uniform but can 
span across two main forms of expression: lower-level (localised ethnic) re-
territorialisation; and/or wider-level (ethno-national) re-territorialisation. In terms of 
lower-level re-territorialisation, there is an indefinite number of outlets that refugees can 
subscribe to, including: a general intolerance towards outsider groups; tendency to live 
in ghettoes; wearing traditional clothing, etc. In terms of wider-level re-territorialisation, 
the number of outlets are exhaustive, and five in total, these include: a passive 
reference to the departed homeland (WL-1); an assertive demand to return to the 
departed homeland (WL-2); tying their persecuted identity with that of the host nation 
(WL-3); pursuit of an autonomy movement within the host nation (WL-4); and finally, 
an outright separatist movement out of the host nation (WL-5). The particular forms of 
expression and outlets subscribed depend largely upon the group’s memory of exile as 
well as the surrounding contextual conditions at any given time. Furthermore, the 
forms/outlets subscribed to by the refugee group, or rather by individuals within the 
group, can, and most probably will, modify throughout time. The very act of re-
territorialisation, however, does entail friction, especially with regards to zero-sum 
outlets (i.e. WL-4 and WL-5), which pose a direct challenge to the interests of out-
groups, and thereby can very likely trigger ethno-national conflict. 
 
Background to the Sikh refugees of India’s Partition 
Having revealed the mechanisms behind the re-territorialisation of persecuted identity, 
it is now necessary to provide a background to the case under analysis: the Sikh 
refugees of India’s Partition. 
 
Partition of India 
By the time that the last batch of British troops made their symbolic exit through the 
Gateway of India in Bombay (now Mumbai) on 28 February 1948, the Raj had 
transferred administrative control over its erstwhile territories in the subcontinent to not 
one but two dominions: truncated, and principal successor state, India, with its Hindu 
majority; and the newly formed Muslim-majority state of Pakistan. Although the roots of 
Muslim separatism in the subcontinent are long and disputed, the notion of actually 
carving out a separate Muslim state or states as such had been a relatively recent 
conception—introduced in Choudhry Rahmat Ali’s pamphlet of 1933. However, it was 
not until March 1940, when the All-India Muslim League passed its infamous Lahore
                                                
2 This process is extendable beyond first generation refugees to include post-event offspring on account 
of the latter also being divorced from their homeland. 
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Resolution calling for areas in which the Muslims constituted a majority (namely the 
north-western and eastern zones of India) to be grouped together to form separate 
independent Muslim states, that the prospect became a live political issue in India. 
Though it is debatable as to whether Muslim support for Pakistan was fuelled by: a 
genuine fear of Hindu domination at the centre; the prospect of personal political or 
economic gain; a firm belief in a separate nationality from that of the Hindus; a desire 
to set-up an administrative zone for the implementation of Shariah Law; a misguided 
notion of what ‘Pakistan’ entailed and/or where its borders would lie; or indeed sheer 
irrational sentimentality, the Muslim electorate seemed to rally behind the Muslim 
League in impressive fashion in the 1946 Constituent Assembly elections. This arguably 
gave the Pakistan movement a credible mandate, and owing to an aggregate of other 
factors, the plan to partition India along communal lines was officially agreed upon in 
early June 1947 by the three major stakeholders in the country: the Indian National 
Congress, the All-India Muslim League, and the representative of the British Crown, 
Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten. 
As a result of the division, the new state of Pakistan was carved out of the north-
western and north-eastern wings of the subcontinent, and, sandwiched between, 
approximately one thousand miles of Indian Territory. The Muslim-majority provinces 
of Baluchistan, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (hereafter NWFP, and now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) and the western portion of Punjab, constituted West Pakistan,3 with the 
eastern portion of Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam constituting East Pakistan. 
Punjab and Bengal were the only two Muslim-majority provinces of British India to be 
divided along religious lines. This occurred largely due to pressure from the substantial 
non-Muslim populations residing in these provinces, and their political leaders, who 
fiercely opposed the prospect of their ‘homelands’ being subject to long-term Muslim 
domination whether in the form of ‘compulsory grouping’ as set out in the 1946 
Cabinet Mission Plan or the complete partition of India. Despite Jinnah’s objection to 
the partitioning of Punjab and Bengal,4 the non-Muslim stance seemed more resolute.5 
                                                
3 The Pakistan administered territories of Kashmir, gained during the First Kashmir War (1947-1948) with 
India, held a different constitutional status from the rest of West Pakistan. 
4 According to Lord Mountbatten, when presenting Jinnah with the prospect of a divided Punjab and 
Bengal as requisite for Pakistan’s creation, the latter objected that: ‘A man is a Punjabi or a Bengali first 
before he is a Hindu or a Muslim. If you give us those provinces you must, under no condition, partition 
them. You will destroy their viability and cause endless bloodshed and trouble’ (quoted in Collins and 
Lapierre 1981, 42). Jinnah also pointed out that if provinces could be divided simply because their 
minority populations demanded so, then ‘the result of that will be, logically, that all other provinces will 
have to be cut up in a smaller way which will be dangerous’ i.e. that Muslim minorities in Hindu-
majority provinces such as UP could demand to be included within Pakistan (The Tribune, 1 May 1947). 
5 Congressman Dr Rajendra Prasad pointed out the obvious flaw in Jinnah’s desperate argument, 
suggesting that ‘in terms of their own [Lahore] resolution, they cannot demand any areas to be included 
to the Muslim zone which are not contiguous and in which Muslims are not numerically in a majority’ 
[emphasis added] (The Tribune, 1 May 1947). So, with the exception of Sylhet district in Assam, no other 
‘Muslim pockets’ within Hindu-majority states could conceivably merge with Pakistan. 
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For if Muslims could ask to secede from India despite constituting less than a quarter of 
the national population as per the 1941 census, then why could not the non-Muslims of 
Punjab and Bengal (who allegedly constituted a separate nation), when they not only 
constituted well over 40 per cent of those provinces and predominated in certain 
portions of them, not be entitled to demand the partitioning of those provinces along 
communal lines? 
In the months immediately prior, and following, the Partition/independence of the 
subcontinent, the dominions of India and Pakistan were busy absorbing the princely 
states (which by definition were outside of direct British rule). Though all princely states 
were theoretically given the option to declare themselves either as independent, accede 
to India or to Pakistan; a mixture of important factors—such as the feasibility of 
independence, their territorial contiguity to India or Pakistan, whether the 
overwhelming majority of their subjects were Hindu or Muslim, as well as political 
pressure from the Viceroy, New Delhi and Karachi, more often than not, dictated their 
future destiny. While, as it transpired, none actually managed to attain independence, 
the decision of what dominion they should accede to was not always a straightforward 
one.6 Aside from the issue of territory, the partition of India also led to the mammoth 
task of dividing national assets and institutions. This included what had arguably stood 
as the cornerstones of British success in the country: the Indian Civil Service and the 
Indian Army. 
From the perspective of this paper, the most important aspect of Partition was the 
mass exchange of population that took place between the two dominions, resulting in, 
by the time of the 1951 censuses, 8,229,699 people in India that were ‘Born in 
Pakistan’7 (virtually all of whom were non-Muslim Partition refugees) and 7,226,584 
Muslims in Pakistan that were ‘Born in India’8 (once again this number represents 
Partition refugees/migrants, though this time the Muslims from India). However, the true 
number of refugees would probably have been higher than these figures suggest. This is 
on account of many such people dying in the period between their arrival and the 1951 
census. Many of these refugees often came on foot or bullock cart in kalifas (one of 
which was apparently 800,000 people strong, in a procession forty-five miles long), 
while others arrived via overloaded trains (Keller 1975, 37). These forms of transport, 
even when escorted by police and military personnel, were highly dangerous and were
                                                
6 Aside from the notorious Kashmir case; Muslim rulers of states holding solid Hindu majorities, such as 
Junagadh in Kathiawar peninsula and Hyderabad in the Deccan, expressed desires to stay outside of the 
Indian Union (with the Nawab of Junagadh going to the extent of demanding union with Pakistan). 
Strangely even the Rajput state of Jodhpur, with its Hindu ruler and Hindu majority actually protested in 
support of unification with Pakistan. 
7 See Census of India 1951, 248. According to the same census, there were 3,231,981 ‘displaced 
persons’ residing in the Punjab Sub-Zone people—2,375,977 were in Punjab state, 355,952 in Patiala 
and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), 4,496 in Himachal and 495,391 in Delhi (Census of India 1951a: 
32-33). 
8 Census of Pakistan 1951, 31. 
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regularly besieged by looters and marauders belonging to the ‘other community’ 
residing in nearby villages, or indeed kalifas heading in the opposite direction. In the 
innumerable ‘little incidents’ of violence that occurred during Partition, hundreds if not 
thousands of localised minorities were killed within a matter of a few hours; several of 
their womenfolk raped and abducted in the presence of their brothers, husbands and 
fathers (Talib [1950] 1991; Brass 2003; Menon 2006). Those who were fortunate 
enough were able to use safer forms of transport to cross the border, such as road 
vehicles or even airplane (though these people were extremely few in percentage 
terms). In all, it is reasonable to say that this mass exchange of population was arguably 
both the result of, and a contributor towards, the communal genocide of 
localised/provincial minority populations. The motives behind much of the Partition 
violence has been open to contention by both those directly involved in it, and scholars 
who have since analysed the event. However, it is fairly certain that it spanned, to 
varying degrees, one or a combination of the following: petty economic gain, religious 
and nationalist fanaticism, retribution for what the other community had done (or was 
doing) to their people across the border, and even as a ‘defensive’ measure. It is in this 
milieu that we shall pay attention to the Sikh refugees, who formed a significant part of 
the non-Muslims expellee population of West Pakistan and Pakistan Administered 
Kashmir. 
 
Sikh Refugees 
Although the vast majority of Sikh refugees came from west Punjab, there were 
substantial Sikh populations based in Kashmir, in Pashto-speaking NWFP, a small 
presence in Sind (predominantly in Karachi), and an extremely sparse population in 
Baluchistan.9 It is generally acknowledged that the Sikhs, together with Hindus, were 
by-and-large a well-to-do population in the territories that would become West 
Pakistan. Indeed, a disproportionately high number of urban businesses, banks and 
money-lenders, were in the hands of non-Muslims,10 and that the two largest cities in 
West Pakistan on the eve of Partition, Karachi and Lahore, owed their economic 
prowess primarily to the efforts of such people. 
The Sikhs, in particular those belonging to the Jat caste, had acquired the 
distinction of being the ‘best agriculturalists’ in the whole of India (Harnam Singh 1945, 
64). Jat Sikhs, many of whom had migrated from the eastern portion of Punjab state 
towards the west in the 1880s, were largely responsible for transforming the barren 
wastelands of districts such as Montgomery and Sheikhupura into the most prosperous 
                                                
9 According to the 1941 census, there were 1,509,499 Sikhs in west Punjab (including Bahawalpur) 
alone (Census of India 1941, 41-45). There were a total of 62,411 in NWFP (including the surrounding 
states and agencies), 32,627 in Sindh (including Khairpur) and a total of 12,044 in Baluchistan (including 
the surrounding states and agencies) (Census of India 1941a, 100). 
10 In NWFP and Punjab these tended to include castes that had generations of experience in such sectors, 
such as Khatris and Aroras (these castes cut across Hindu-Sikh religious lines), as well as Hindu Banias. 
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and productive agricultural lands in the whole of Punjab, India. These ‘canal colonies’, 
as they were known, were nine in total on the eve of 1947 and all were ultimately 
awarded to Pakistan (Krishan 2004, 80). To give a better sense of the economic 
dexterity of the non-Muslims in comparison to the Muslims of Punjab, despite the latter 
forming a majority population, their ‘land revenue share…in the province [was only] 44 
per cent and their contribution to other taxes, including income tax, [was] hardly 20 
per cent. On the whole, the economic share of Muslims [was] hardly 30 per cent’.11 On 
this basis, it is unlikely that the decision of the numerous Sikh families to move 
eastwards was taken lightly. While some Sikhs in the territory earmarked by 
‘Pakistanists’12 began fleeing their homes in late 1946 and early 1947,13 the decision to 
migrate further eastwards occurred largely when it became obvious that Punjab would 
be divided along communal lines (and the eastern section awarded to India). Though 
some simply migrated due to their historical inhibitions about living under Muslim rule, 
many others probably would have reconciled themselves to life in West Pakistan but for 
the steady realisation that the assurances given by senior Muslim Leaguers to protect 
the life and property of non-Muslims14 were either hollow if not completely 
disingenuous (on account of the ever-increasing level of violence directed towards the 
minorities as the handover date approached).  
However, the majority of Sikh refugees experienced forced removal from their 
homes, and gangs of marauders looted and set fire to their properties on a grand-scale. 
Very often, those fleeing were killed, and in many villages all non-Muslims were 
systematically massacred. In fact, many non-Muslim refugees later testified that 
Muslims holding senior positions told them blankly that Sikh and Hindu kafirs had no 
right to exist in, and ‘pollute’ the land of, Pakistan.15 In such conditions of torment, the 
only credible alternative to not migrating was to disassociate from their ancestral 
religions and ‘embrace’ Islam. By 1948, virtually the entire non-Muslim population of 
West Pakistan had disappeared, going down from 22.9 percent to 2.9 per cent in just a
                                                
11 FN 2-B/47 [Rajendra Prasad Papers, National Archives Museum, New Delhi], 26. 
12 In other words, the supporters of the Pakistan demand. 
13 In Hazara district, NWFP, in December 1946, and across many of the districts Rawalpindi and Multan 
divisions in March 1947, thousands of Hindus and Sikhs were massacred by Muslim mobs. The non-
Muslims that fled these areas were usually accommodated in refugee camps in Punjabi territory that 
would become part of Pakistan.   
14 After the fall of the Unionist-led ministry in early March 1947, Khan Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot 
declared that ‘it has never been the desire of the Muslim League to impose the communal domination of 
Muslims over non-Muslim…it will be our endeavour to secure the willing co-operation of all Hindus and 
Sikhs and other minorities for the purpose of building up a happy and prosperous Punjab’ (quoted in The 
Tribune, 4 March 1947). 
15 Heera Lal quoted in Verma 2004, 46; ‘Memo: Montgomery District Disturbances’, Fact Finding 
Branch, Ministry of Relief & Rehabilitation, Government of India, New Delhi, Acc No. 1409 [Prof Kirpal 
Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], 5. 
 
 
2017   |   The South Asianist 5 (1): 249-281   |   pg. 256 
matter of months.16 The true number of these refugees killed or abducted may never be 
known, however, together with the Muslim victims of Partition, this figure is assumed to 
be within the hundreds of thousands at least, if not into the millions.17 The Sikh refugees 
tended to settle down in ethnically familiar east Punjab,18 and in particular those 
districts most proximate to the new international border, as well as within the territories 
of Sikh states such as Faridkot and Patiala. Such was the demographic upheaval in 
Punjab that the Sikhs, who prior to 1947 held a mere 13.22 per cent of the population 
of British Punjab and were so thinly dispersed that they failed to command a majority in 
any one of the 29 districts of the province (see Maps 1 and 2 below main text), actually 
became a majority in four out of remaining thirteen districts and the largest group in 
another one (see Map 3).19  
Hindu refugees on the other hand, tended to settle at some distance away from the 
Pakistan border, with many either heading for the South-eastern parts of Punjab 
(territory which would later constitute Haryana post-1966), or actually further afield to 
parts of India that were markedly dissimilar, culturally and geographically, from that of 
their ancestral homes (Kamath 1984, 139; Sharma 1994, 337). 
 
Re-territorialisation of Sikh-ness in post-Partition Indian Punjab 
Following a thorough consultation of associated evidence, it appears that, in 
consonance with the main claim of this paper, Sikh refugees, together with their post-
event offspring, did indeed re-territorialise their persecuted identity, and that 
engagement in this process contributed toward the rise of ethno-national conflict in 
Indian Punjab. This following section will describe and critically assess this re-
territorialisation process, as evident across its two main levels: lower-level and wider-
level. 
 
Lower-level re-territorialisation 
From what can be discerned, there were three main lower-level outlets through which 
the Sikh refugees, and to a lesser degree their post-event offspring, sought to engage in 
re-territorialising their persecuted identity. The first outlet was to resort to, or aid in, 
outright communal violence against non-Sikhs. While this particular lower-level outlet 
                                                
16 See Census of India 1941, 41-45; Census of India 1941a, 100; Census of Pakistan 1951a, 1-26. It 
should be noted that in West Pakistan—the Federal Capital Area of Karachi, Punjab and NWFP—the 
majority of the remaining non-Muslim population were Christian. 
17 In a study centred upon the demographic losses of Partition, it was calculated that in Punjab alone the 
total ‘unaccounted for’ population ranged from anywhere between 2.3 million to 3.2 million (Hill et al 
2008, 155). 
18 This was unlike the Hindu Sindhi refugees who failed in their attempt to divide Sindh along communal 
lines and thereby had, upon arrival, no option but to settle in linguistically dissimilar territory. 
19 Sikhs were also now the largest group (49.29 per cent), though not the majority, in the new 
administrative body of PEPSU (created in 1948) which consisted of all former Punjab princely states 
barring Bahawalpur, which had joined Pakistan (Census of India 1951b, 298-299). 
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was often deployed in order to satisfy an associated wider-level goal (i.e. WL-4/WL-5), 
it is clear that for many refugees the ‘reprisal’ killings were an end in itself, akin to what 
Coser (1956, 49) termed ‘non-realistic’ conflict. For instance, one interviewee, 
Lakshman Singh Duggal, who admitted to murdering a ‘handful’ of innocent Muslims 
and briefly harbouring a woman abductee, seemed to indicate that his chief motive was 
more therapeutic than material:  
 
Their ghosts [of the Muslim victims he killed] still surround me…I have to say there is 
rarely a day that goes by that I don’t think about what I’d done…I do regret my actions 
now, absolutely…but in truth, at that time…for a good while at least…finishing these 
Muslims made me feel at ease…I suppose I wanted them [the Muslims] to feel the pain I 
had felt, and will always feel, at losing my sister and father to the bastards that plundered 
my village…[getting increasingly emotional]…I felt this [killing of Muslims] was the only 
way the fire inside of me could be put out.20 
 
This perhaps serves to explain why the tactics of violence used against the 
Muslims in the east, such as to attack refugee convoys that were already on their 
way to Pakistan, far exceeded that ‘necessary’ to prompt their departure (Copland 
2002, 697). Of course, this particular outlet of lower-level re-territorialisation was 
not aimed solely against the Muslims but, in decades subsequent, and together with 
some major changes in the shape of their collective memory21 of Partition, 
extended to the Hindu ‘enemy’ also. This extension occurred partly because 
conflict behaviour against the ‘original object’, i.e. Muslim Punjabis, was blocked 
(Coser 1956, 40). Furthermore, it seems that members of refugee families that did 
not engage in ‘reprisals’ against Muslims in the east or forcibly obtain evacuee 
property (thus holding deeper pent-up feelings of injustice and even ‘shame’ at not 
being able to exact revenge),22 were more likely to engage in violence during the 
Khalistan movement.23 
A Sikh refugee who did not participate in the Partition violence but did so 
during the Khalistan movement stated the following: 
 
We lost everything we had, we came here penniless…Regretfully I was just a boy at the 
time, I was my parents’ eldest [child] but was still physically weak for my age, had I been 
older I may have been able to do something to protect the honour of my people…we lost 
                                                
20 Interview with Lakshman Singh Duggal, Amritsar, 12 September 2010. 
21 This is the idea that groups are tied together through shared memories—whether at the level of the 
family, nation or even religious community—to the point that without them, a group could seldom exist 
at all (Halbwachs 1925; Nora 1989; Connerton 1989). 
22 This is not to say refugees who exacted revenge against the Muslims in the east no longer held a 
‘victimhood-rich’ memory of exile, given that they still perceived themselves to be ‘net losers’ during the 
Partition exchanges, only that for such people the intensity of such feeling was far less. 
23 The Khalistan movement was an armed secessionist struggle carried out by the Sikhs of Punjab, India, 
which spanned, approximately, the period between 1981 and 1993. 
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everything but damage to our honour was more upsetting…I used to think maybe I could 
have done something…[Despite saying he has always considered Khalistan a ‘silly idea’, 
he admitted to ‘foolishly’ helping to prompt the departure of some local Hindu 
shopkeepers during the militant movement. When asked if he had any regrets?]…Feel sorry 
for them [the Hindus]?...Why not ask the Hindus in Delhi if they are sorry for burning our 
people alive?…I haven’t heard even one apology yet...Let’s not forget we Sikhs have 
suffered more dislocation than anyone else, the Partition [of 1947] cut us right down the 
middle? Who was there to feel sorry for us, what sympathy did we get from India?...In fact, 
rather than help us, [Vallabhbhai] Patel called us a ‘criminal tribe’, can you believe 
that?...After everything we had done for the freedom of the country, they are calling us 
such names [emphasis added].24 
 
A Sikh refugee who had participated in the Partition violence but did not 
participate during the Khalistan movement, made the following observation: 
 
It is impossible for you to imagine the transformation that people went through from the 
periods of calm beforehand, to the hell that was unleashed during those bitter months…A 
[Muslim] person who I had despised two days beforehand because of an argument we had 
over some trivial matter actually came to my rescue at the risk of his own life…Yet people 
who you thought were sincere, who you could depend on to remain calm, went 
completely berserk…it was like that for me, I could never have imagined that I was 
capable of killing another being, it was simply not in my character… but it was the 
conditions that drove me to it…[When asked about whether the Khalistani militancy was 
justified] No not at all, Partition thought me a lesson that this kind of violence can only 
bring misery ultimately, there is no positive which can come out of it, because the people 
who get killed ultimately are always the ones who are innocent, the instigators on the other 
hand only spark the flames, disappear during the fighting, and then profit from the misery 
afterwards [emphasis added].25 
 
A second lower-level outlet subscribed to involved Sikh refugee attempts to 
ghettoise (Puri, Judge and Sekhon 1999, 40), if not completely monopolise, the space 
around which they had settled. This was particularly apparent in urban centres. The 
chief means for doing so, especially true of those Sikhs from castes with a mercantile 
tradition (i.e. Khatris/Aroras), was to not only enter into the service industry hitherto 
dominated by Hindu banias, but to do so through ‘aggressive’ means. This aggression, 
stemming largely (though by no means solely) from their Partition experiences, led 
them to (among other things) adopt a near risk-averse attitude to business.26 Providing 
evidence in this regard, Dr Mohinder Singh, remarked: 
 
                                                
24 Interview with Avtar Singh Kohli, Amritsar, 19 September 2010. 
25 Interview with Lakshman Singh Duggal, Amritsar, 12 September 2010. 
26 Many Sikhs share this view (Sikh refugee #35 quoted in Keller 1975, 84; Interview with Jagdish Singh 
conducted by Prof. Ian Talbot’, Amritsar, 21 November 2002, quoted in Talbot and Tatla 2006, 115). 
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You know there was a joke about us…it goes, when the British came back to Delhi in 
1948 a few months after they left, they asked someone in the restaurant, ‘Where have all 
those tall handsome waiters that used to serve us last time gone?’…and the owner replies 
‘The Sikh refugees?...They are all running big businesses across the city’…[Laughter]…You 
see when we came the local banias considered us a threat to their enterprise…So what we 
used to do is buy stocks of sugar, and then sell them at cost price…The banias said, ‘Oh 
they’ll never make any profit, what do they know about business?’...but then since 
everyone was buying from us we put them out of work [emphasis added].27 
 
Clearly such entry and behaviour, while spelling many positive impacts for their 
host society, came almost exclusively at the expense of the Hindu bania.28 This gave 
the ‘business rivalry’ a manifestly communal dimension (Bonacich 1972, 553; Weiner 
1978, 7). In addition, and giving way to occasions of intra-group competition, the fact 
that there were numerous incidents of wealthy Sikh refugees extending financial 
support (sometimes even across caste lines) to fellow Sikh refugees, a privilege which 
seldom stretched to Hindus, would suggest that their entry into business, and 
‘aggression’ in such matters, had at least a partial communal motive in conjunction 
with more obvious financial ones.  
A third lower-level re-territorialisation outlet involved refugees voting for, and 
engaging with, principally ‘communal-leaning’ political parties. In the Sikh refugee 
case, this was seen in their support of the Shriomani Akali Dal, which was 
disproportionately high,29 as opposed to apparently more ‘secular’ parties such as the 
Indian National Congress. Hukum Singh, whose long political career exhibited strong 
communal sensibilities, admitted that: 
 
my purpose, objective or functions, whatever you might call them, after joining the 
Constituent Assembly, were confined mainly to two spheres…One was service to the 
refugees because [he] was also a refugee, and…had suffered much in Pakistan. And the 
other was securing safeguards for the minorities [i.e. Sikhs].30 
 
It is also worth noting that Hindu refugees, sharing similar Partition-related 
experiences/grievances to that of the Sikh refugees, also exhibited a political ‘shift to the 
right’ by forming a key constituency for the Jan Sangh/BJP (Gupta 1996, 22). 
                                                
27 Interview with Dr Mohinder Singh, Delhi, 21 August 2010. 
28 The existence of such friction between Khatri Sikhs and Hindu bania in areas of trade has been noted 
by Gopal Singh (1987, 222). 
29 This was also partly owed to pre-existing caste allegiances between the Sikh refugee voters, who were 
largely Khatri, and the Khatri-dominated Shiromani Akali Dal leadership (which was the case until 1962). 
30 ‘Interview with Hukum Singh conducted by S. L. Manchanda’, New Delhi, 4 April 1976, Acc No. 344 
[Oral History Collection, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi], 103. 
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Wider-Level Re-territorialisation 
In addition to lower-level forms of expression, Sikh refugees/post-event offspring have 
endeavoured to re-territorialise their persecuted identity through wider-level means as 
well. However, particular wider-level outlets have had greater prominence at certain 
times than have others since 1947. 
 
Immediate Aftermath of Partition (1947-1950) 
In the period immediately following their arrival into truncated Punjab/India, it appears 
that the Sikh refugees sought to re-territorialise their persecuted identity by subscribing 
to, albeit to varying degrees, all five wider-level outlets available: namely, WL-1, WL-2, 
WL-3, WL-4, WL-5. Passive association with their departed homeland (WL-1) was 
demonstrated by virtually all refugees.31 This involved: (1) frequent reference, at times 
of memory recall, to their former, ancestral homes, agricultural lands as well as Sikh 
cultural and historic sites; (2) attaching the name of their ancestral village/town to their 
own surname, or maintaining/adding territorial reference to their former villages or 
towns in their business names; and (3) displaying, what might be described as, subtle 
‘re-unificationist sentiment’, such as viewing Partition with deep regret,32 or by 
favouring ’softer borders’,33 or advocating some form of confederation34 between all 
former Indian territories. 
There were also assertive demands to return to their homeland (WL-2). This outlet 
was subscribed to for the shortest period of time out of the five outlets available, 
perhaps, at most, for a few months after their arrival. Evidence that this outlet was 
subscribed to at all comes from numerous refugee testimonies which suggest that they 
had assumed that migration would only be a ‘temporary measure’ and had, in 
consequence, left many of their movables in West Pakistan or failed to sell their assets 
prior to setting off eastward.35 In fact, many refugees conceded that ‘only after some 
time’ did it dawn on them the migration was a permanent arrangement. Once this 
became apparent, they appeared to retreat from this outlet and engaged in other more 
                                                
31 Indeed, it remains an outlet for many refugees/post-event offspring until the present day. 
32 This view cuts across political alignments. With the Khalistani, and Sikh refugee, Ganga Singh Dhillon 
who lost his father during the Partition violence, referring to assassinated Pakistani statesman Chaudhari 
Elahi as, ‘a great man…[since] he was always for the unity of India and Pakistan’ [emphasis added] 
(quoted in Satinder Singh 1982, 148). 
33 All of the following interviewees have expressed their support for ‘softer borders’ between India and 
Pakistan (the first two being post-event offspring, and the latter three refugees)—Interview with Massa 
Singh, Amritsar, 20 September 2010; Interview with Tridivesh Singh Maini, London, 7 March 2011; 
‘Interview with Dalip Singh conducted by Prof. Ian Talbot’, Amritsar, 18 January 2003, quoted in Talbot 
and Tatla 2006, 71; ‘Interview with Gurbachan Singh Bhatti conducted by Prof. Ian Talbot’, Amritsar, 18 
February 2003, quoted in Talbot and Tatla 2006, 77; ‘Interview with Gurdeep Singh Bhatia conducted by 
Prof. Ian Talbot’, Amritsar, 23 January 2003, quoted in Talbot and Tatla 2006, 92. 
34 Interview with Tarlochan Singh, Delhi, 19 August 2010. 
35 Sikh refugee #13 quoted in Keller 1975, 44; Interview with Paramjit Singh Sarna, Delhi, 21 August 
2010; Interview with Kuldip Nayar, Delhi, 29 August 2010. 
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feasible outcomes. It was only staunch, but increasingly marginalised, patriots, chiefly 
those who had served in the Indian National Army under leaders Subhas Chandra Bose 
and General Mohan Singh, who continued to support this outlet. This was in 
concurrence with their wider vision to destroy Pakistan and bring about a complete re-
unification of India. 
Tying their identity with that of India (WL-3), though this was a moderately popular 
form of articulation, it must be said that, and contrary to the suggestion made by 
Kamath (1984, 139), this was problematic for both Sikhs and Hindus. This is largely 
because of: (1) the bitterness toward the Indian National Congress for having ‘sold out’ 
on the refugees by consenting to Partition; and (2) the dilemma arising from the fact 
‘their’ homes, and what they understood as constituting ‘their’ Punjab, ‘their’ India, 
now lay under Pakistani sovereignty. Consequently, tying their persecuted identity with 
their host-nation, which despite still being India by name, seemed slightly feigned. 
However, it is probably true that Sikh refugees had more difficulty than the Hindu 
refugees in this regard (Narang 1986, 28-29), principally because they held fears, 
whether legitimate or not, that their unique religious identity would be absorbed into 
the majority one. Therefore, WL-3 came with the condition that it could persist only as 
long as the Indian state and Hindu majority respected the Sikh community and its 
religious freedoms. 
Pursuit of autonomy (WL-4) was undoubtedly the most popular outlet of wider-
level re-territorialisation expressed by the Sikh refugees. Evidence for this is twofold: (1) 
their choice of destination, as mentioned previously, unlike most Hindu refugees, 
tended to be east Punjab; and (2) their role in prompting Muslims to leave east Punjab, 
thereby ’sanctifying’ their new land for their hitherto persecuted Sikh identity to 
flourish. Although fairly obvious, the main reason for why WL-4 was the most popular 
at this stage was because it was the most desirable outlet among the feasible ones 
available. 
As far as support for an outright separatist movement (WL-5) is concerned, while 
there were reports of armed Akali bands distributing leaflets across east Punjab in the 
name of the ‘Government of Khalistan’ and the Maharajah of Patiala, allegedly 
contemplating heading a confederation of Sikh states (Dhanwantri and Joshi 1947, 24-
25), this was perhaps the least endorsed wider-level outlet. The following reasons give 
an indication as to why this was the case (in the order of the first being the most 
important): (1) it was simply not feasible to carve out a separate state of their own; (2) 
there was an awareness, at least among politically alert Sikhs, that Nehru had promised 
them a ‘glow of freedom’ in India and so it was thought that he, allegedly being a man 
of principle, would do good on that; (3) there was a belief that India would pursue a 
path of secularism, be it in the French tradition of laïcité or the Hindu manner of sarva 
dharma sambhava, meaning that the Sikh religion and identity would be able enjoy 
sufficient freedom; and (4) the Sikh refugees held a sense of compassion for the Hindu 
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Punjabis, particularly those that were also made refugees, and so did not want to 
behave ‘selfishly’ like the Muslims by demanding their own. 
 
Push for Autonomy (1950-1966) 
In the period between 1950 and 1966 the choice of wider-level outlets subscribed to by 
the Sikh refugees witnessed considerable change from what had been the case during 
the previous epoch. While WL-1 remained quite popular; both WL-2 and WL-5 (for 
reasons pertaining to a lack of feasibility) virtually ceased to be articulated. At the same 
time WL-4 not only remained the most prevalent but grew even more so and, 
seemingly, at the direct expense of WL-3. 
The clearest evidence in support of the view that WL-4 was an increasingly popular 
outlet was the strong Sikh refugee support for the controversial36 Punjabi suba demand, 
in which they actually played a ‘lead-role’. Of course, one could conceivably argue 
that; first, the suba was a territorial demand based on their linguistic identity rather than 
religious, and so was not one that the refugees had experienced persecution of in West 
Pakistan (and so by definition was not in need of re-territorializing); and second, this 
was something which enjoyed pan-Sikh support (i.e. not just refugees). 
However, although the suba was sought ‘officially’ along linguistic lines, the 
underlying basis was in fact communal: the desire to create a Sikh majority state. 
Evidence for this is both circumstantial and direct. The circumstantial evidence being 
that; (1) the SAD initially put forward a demand for a Sikh state across seven out of the 
total thirteen districts of east Punjab on 7 August 1947 without any no reference to its 
linguistic character, and did so on the condition that their calls for Sikhs to be given a 
reservation of seats and separate electorates in post-Partition India were rejected 
(Sharma 1992, 75); (2) when the SAD eventually submitted their territorial demand for a 
re-truncated east Punjab along ‘linguistic’ grounds to the States Reorganisation 
Commission in 1955 it excluded from its claims the Hindu majority Kangra district 
despite it being overwhelmingly Punjabi-speaking in composition (Chopra 1984, 102); 
and (3) the symbolism attached to the suba demand was inextricably linked to the Sikh 
religion, including the phraseology used by SAD elites (Master Tara Singh quoted in 
Nayar 1966, 242), starting pro-suba processions from Sikh shrines and on dates 
important to the Sikh calendar (Kapur 1986, 213). The direct evidence being that; (1) 
based on numerous meetings author Khushwant Singh claims to have had with Master 
Tara Singh, it was agreed that the ‘linguistic argument [would only be the] sugar-
coating for what was essentially a demand for a Sikh majority state’ (1992, 40); (2) 
according to Sant Fateh Singh, Master Tara Singh was really only after a Sikh majority 
suba rather than a Punjab one, with the latter ‘allegedly’ telling the Sant during a 
                                                
36 It was ‘controversial’ in the sense that it provoked strong resistance from certain sections among the 
Hindus. 
2017   |   The South Asianist 5 (1): 249-281   |   pg. 263 
private discussion: ‘For the present, we will talk of the language as the basis, later on 
things will get crystallised by themselves’ (quoted in Anand 1966, 5); (3) Master Tara 
Singh, who as SAD chief led the suba demand until 1962 when he was deposed by 
Sant Fateh Singh, admitted, to Baldev Raj Nayar, that 
 
[t]his cover of a Punjabi-speaking-state slogan serves my purpose well since it does not 
offend against nationalism. The Government should accept our demand under the slogan 
of a Punjabi-speaking state without a probe—what we want is Azadi. The Sikhs have no 
Azadi. We will fight for our Azadi with full power even if we have to revolt for our Azadi 
(quoted in Nayar 1966, 37). 
 
While the suba was a demand that both refugee and non-refugee Sikhs supported, 
there are credible ground for believing the former played a ‘lead-role’. The reasons for 
this are twofold: Firstly, that the SAD leadership (and its associated political demands), 
up until 1962, had been dominated by Sikh refugees,37 and drew its support largely 
from such people. Indeed, one Sikh refugee remarked that,  
 
I was a supporter of the suba after Partition…I sincerely felt that Sikhs should have a seat of 
political power, bearing in mind that we hadn’t got anything from the Partition…but in 
hindsight I would say it has been harmful to the Sikhs, we lost yet more of our shrines and other 
resources.38  
 
Secondly, that the suba demand disguised an underlying insecurity that existed among 
its supporters regarding their religious identity. Although both refugees and non-
refugees could be said to have exhibited such anxieties, it was more so in the case of 
the former as they were first-hand witnesses to the communal genocide inflicted against 
their people in West Pakistan. In other words, refugee ‘paranoia’ over threats to Sikh 
identity had more of a basis than that of non-refugees. Many of the latter, especially 
those who had been involved in the diffusion process,39 simply could not appreciate 
such sentiment. 
 
                                                
37 This view is shared by Robin Jeffrey (1986, 110). There are some other reasons which contributed 
towards the high ‘refugee’ composition in the Shiromani Akali Dal at this stage; first, that the Khatri caste, 
most of whom became refugees as a result of Partition, had dominated the Shiromani Akali Dal 
leadership even before 1947 and merely continued in that vein following; and second, the fact that the 
political capital of British Punjab, Lahore, went to Pakistan meant that most serving Sikh members of the 
Punjab Legislative Assembly, even if they represented in east Punjab, had residences there and hence 
effectively became refugees also. 
38 Interview with Amar Singh Bains, Amritsar, 16 September 2010. 
39 This is the process whereby aspects of the refugee ‘event-related’ memory, during episodes of 
‘personalised interaction’, diffuse horizontally into the consciousness of their non-refugee ethnic kin and 
vertically down into their post-event offspring. 
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Post-Suba (1966-onwards) 
Despite the creation of the Punjabi suba, the sense of Sikh isolationism from the 
national mainstream, which had built-up steadily during the course of the previous two 
decades, seemed to persist even beyond 1966. In fact, it appears that, apart from a few 
isolated occasions in which Indian nationalist sentiment witnessed a mini-surge (i.e. 
most notably during the war with Pakistan in 1971), the trend of growing subscription 
to WL-4 at the expense of WL-3 continued apace for Sikh refugee families (by this time 
inclusive of post-event offspring as well as Sikh refugees proper). This was evidenced 
most clearly by refugee/post-event offspring association with Sikh ethno-nationalist 
charters such as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and Rajiv-Longowal Accord, which 
together included issues pertaining to revisions of centre-state relations in favour of 
more autonomy for the latter, raising the punitive land-ceilings for agriculturalists, 
ensuring Punjab secured a ‘just’ amount of ‘her’ river-waters, and that Chandigarh be 
awarded to Punjab state. 
However, unlike with the Punjabi suba demand in the previous epoch, it cannot be 
sensibly suggested that Sikh refugees played a ‘lead-role’ in this instance, owing to the 
fact that, by this stage the SAD leadership, and crucially nearly all the signatories to the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution, were Malwa Jats (i.e. not refugees). Nevertheless, it can be 
said that refugee association with WL-4 prompted an evoking of their, by now, 
increasingly anti-Hindu/anti-India ‘victimhood-rich’ Partition memory to support this 
conviction and, in consequence, heightened its potency and widened the scope for the 
diffusion of this memory. The net effect of this was to increase the conflict-potential of 
Sikh ethno-national demands far beyond what the numerical strength of the refugees 
would otherwise warrant. To be exact, contemporary Sikh grievances vis-à-vis the 
centre seemed far more acute if one incorporated the refugee exilic memories of their 
livelihoods in territories that became West Pakistan, rather than just comparing them to 
pan-Sikh livelihoods immediately prior to the 1966 trifurcation. This can be 
demonstrated with reference to some of the clauses in the Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution/Rajiv-Longowal Accord, including the three mentioned below. 
First of all, with regards to the clause on land-ceilings, since Sikhs in west Punjab 
tended to constitute, proportionally, the biggest zamindari group across Punjab, there 
was a ‘step-down’ in both the size and fertility of the land following their arrival into 
east Punjab. This was far more severe than those Sikhs native to the east, who had 
mostly never, even before 1947, and much less in the years immediately prior to 1966, 
owned such vast plots. Second concerns the issue of Punjab’s river-waters. While all 
Sikhs could express regret at the loss/diversion of ‘their’ rivers, by incorporating Sikh 
refugee memories of their pre-Partition livelihoods—so as to include (in addition to 
rivers flowing through east Punjab) the loss of rivers flowing through the west40—led to 
                                                
40	Including the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab and most of the Ravi, as well as all nine canal colonies.	
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the water predicament in Punjab, a state expected to serve as the ‘breadbasket’ of India, 
seeming all the more chastising.  Consider this statement from an Amritsar-based 
refugee originally from Lahore:  
 
It’s sad to see now that we only have two, at best two-and-a-half, out of those [Punjab] 
rivers…Yet we still call this place Punjab, but how can it be?…To make matters worse our 
rivers have been diverted by the sarkar in Delhi, towards the Hindus of Haryana, 
Rajasthan…these are Punjabi waters, and they have been since the dawn of history…you 
need only to look at a satellite map to see for yourself…this is fact…They [New Delhi] say, 
‘Oh we must do this [divert waters]…it is for the good of the nation…besides the source of 
Indus rivers are in the Himalayas not in Punjab’…It’s easy to say that when you are the 
ones benefitting from this…but if they are motivated by the nation’s interest, if they are 
truly doing it for the national interest, then why don’t they divert these rivers from near 
their sources towards exclusively Indian territory or build dams up there to stop any water 
from running to Pakistan?...Now that would be for the national interest…I’m sure if the 
source was in Pakistan we wouldn’t even be getting even a drop of that [emphasis 
added].41 
 
Third, since it is commonly held that Chandigarh was built for Punjabis to 
compensate for the loss of Lahore42 by incorporating Sikh refugee Partition memory 
(especially the Lahoris among them), the decision to make it a Union Territory, and a 
shared administrative capital with Haryana state, was viewed as unfair by the Sikhs. 
This was especially aggravated by the fact that many of the Hindus in Haryana had 
essentially seized to regard themselves as Punjabi any longer. 
 
Rise of the Khalistan Movement (1981-onwards) 
From 1981 onwards, though WL-4 remained by-and-large the most popular wider-level 
outlet among Sikh refugees and their post-event offspring, it is clear that WL-5, which 
had hitherto lain largely dormant, witnessed a revival. This can be seen in large-scale 
Sikh refugee/post-event offspring participation and facilitation of Khalistan-based 
militancy. Such was the refugee contribution in this regard that this paper holds 
credible grounds to suggest that they actually played a ‘lead-role’ in the rise of the 
Khalistan movement.43 For instance, the following interviewee remarks are revealing in 
this regard: 
 
The militancy broke caste barriers, actually there were occasions when a cell would be 
headed by a Mazhabi, with Jat boys acting as their understudy…this kind of thing would 
                                                
41 Interview with Avtar Singh Kohli, Amritsar, 19 September 2010. 
42	Indian Express, 12 May 2009.	
43 The theme of refugees playing a ‘lead-role’ in nationalist projects is one that was exhibited by the 
refugee Turk population during the 1920s with respect to the establishment of a Turkish republic in 
Anatolia during the demise of the Ottoman Empire (Zücher 2013).   
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have been unheard of in previous times…but all in all it was the Jats who dominated the 
militancy, at least by its peak…although, this wasn’t the case from the start…for the first 
few years at least, at least until Blue Star and maybe for some time more, it was Khatri 
youth [post-event offspring] that were taking up arms…so it was natural for Jats to follow 
the Khatris, as all ten of our Gurus were from that caste [emphasis added].44 
 
Those who had come from Pakistan at the time of Partition…you could say they were 
more aggrieved at the situation [during the 1980s] than others…from where they been 
over there [in Pakistan], living like kings and all, to what was going on here, having to 
compete with the banias just to stay afloat…So I would say the Bhapas were the ones who 
started much of the rioting against the Hindus…this was early on…places like Patiala…this 
was two or three years of years before 1984…but I think, it must have occurred to them 
later that Khalistan might well result in their freedom from the bania, but instead they will 
have to face domination from the Jats [laughter]…Maybe this is why Khalistan could never 
have come in, because all Sikhs other than Jats feared the Jats [laughter].45 
 
Speculating as to why Sikh refugees and their post-event offspring may have been 
more willing to associate themselves with or directly participate in the Khalistan 
militancy than their non-refugee ethnic kin, a few factors are worth considering: First, 
since refugee/post-event offspring had suffered far more adversely from Partition than 
their non-refugee ethnic kin, they had further reason to feel aggrieved at their current 
predicament for which, as per the present shape of their Partition memory, they viewed 
Hindus as culpable. The second factor being the prevailing sense of injustice, especially 
for those who had not managed to exact ‘revenge’ from the stranded Muslims 
immediately upon arrival. The intensity of this feeling, at the time, meant that 
engagement in the Khalistan movement, which involved violence against Hindu 
Punjabis and the Indian state forces, provided an opportunity to rectify past injustices 
done to them or elder members of the family at the time of Partition. A third factor is 
the paranoia associated with the loss of, and attacks to, Sikh identity were more 
pronounced, since they had either personal or familial experience of being persecuted 
for their religious identity and being driven out from their ethnic homelands. A fourth 
reason that Sikh refugees and their post-event offspring seemed more willing to 
associate themselves with Khalistani militancy is that since 1962, and the Malwa Jat 
usurping of SAD power, the Khatris (who made up the bulk of the Sikh refugee 
population), moved further to ‘the right’ in a bid to maintain their political visibility vis-
à-vis the Sikh masses.46  
Whether or not one is inclined to agrees the view that Sikh refugees and their post-
event offspring played a ‘lead-role’ in the rise of the Khalistan movement and the 
                                                
44 Interview with Davinder Singh, Ludhiana, 2 September 2010. 
45 Interview with Gurbaksh Singh, Ludhiana, 4 September 2010. 
46 It is a point of note that many of the leaders of pro-Khalistani groups, such as the Dal Khalsa as well as 
many militant cells, were from refugee families. 
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speculative reasons for that, it is difficult to refute that, very much as with the Anandpur 
Sahib Resolution/Rajiv-Longowal provisions, mere refugee association with the 
Khalistan movement (WL-5), and the frequent use of their victimhood-rich ‘collective 
memory’ of Partition to support that association, manifestly increased the conflict-
potential of this movement. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
In order to help corroborate or falsify the credence of the findings in the above section 
which suggest Sikh refugees re-territorialised their persecuted identity and that this 
contributed towards the rise of ethno-national conflict in Indian Punjab; a bivariate test 
has been devised, which focuses its attention on one of the most illustrative cases of 
ethno-national conflict in Indian Punjab since 1947: the Khalistan movement. It tests 
the direction and strength of the correlation existing between Sikh refugee distribution 
and Khalistani militancy rates. The secondary quantitative data used in this research 
included, on Sikh refugees, the district-wise ‘Born in Pakistan’47 population count 
across Punjab state, sourced from the 1981 and 1991 GOI censuses;48 and on Khalistan 
militancy rates, the district-wise breakdown of ‘Hard-core Terrorists Killed in Punjab’ 
sourced from SATP and the ‘Police Officers Martyred in Punjab’ sourced from the 
Punjab police: 
 
Census figures on refugee distribution: 
§ Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1981 (% of State-level BPP) (see Map 6) 
§ Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1991 (% of State-level BPP) (see Map 7) 
 
Militancy figures during rise of Khalistan movement: 
§ Police Officers Martyred in Punjab 1986-1990 (see Map 8) 
§ Hard-core Terrorists Killed in Punjab 1988-1990 (see Map 9) 
 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient tests 
In total four correlation tests were conducted. 
§ T-1: Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1981 (% of State-level BPP) vs. Police Officers 
Martyred in Punjab 1986-1990. 
§ T-2: Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1981 (% of State-level BPP) vs. Hard-core 
Terrorists Killed in Punjab 1988-1990. 
                                                
47 While the ‘Born in Pakistan’ population is not the same as ‘refugee population’, the vast majority of 
people in this category were indeed refugees from West Pakistan. Also it must be noted that while these 
statistics make no religious distinction between Hindu and Sikh refugees, it has already been established 
that the overwhelming portion of partition refugees that arrived within the districts that would later 
constitute Punjab post-1966, were Sikhs. As such these statistics resemble very closely the ‘true’ Sikh 
refugee population distribution. 
48 These particular census years have been used since they cut across the period corresponding with the 
‘rise’ of the Khalistan movement. 
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§ T-3: Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1991 (% of State-level BPP) vs. Police Officers 
Martyred in Punjab 1986-1990. 
§ T-4: Born in Pakistan Population (BPP), 1981 (% of State-level BPP) vs. Hard-core 
Terrorists Killed in Punjab 1988-1990. 
 
T-1: Correlation Results 
 
Born in Pakistan 
pop, 1981 
Police Officers Killed 
(1986-1990) 
Spearman's 
rho 
Born in Pakistan Pop, 
1981 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .853** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .000 
N 12 12 
Police Officers Killed 
(1986-1990) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.853** 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 . 
N 12 12 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
T-2: Correlation Results 
 
Born in Pakistan 
pop, 1981 
Hard-core terrorists 
killed (1988-1990) 
Spearman's 
rho 
 Born in Pakistan Pop, 
1981 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .734** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .003 
N 12 12 
Hard-core Terrorists 
Killed (1988-1990) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.734** 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .003 . 
N 12 12 
 
T-3: Correlation Results 
 
Born in Pakistan 
pop, 1991 
Police officers killed 
(1986-1990) 
Spearman's 
rho 
Born in Pakistan Pop, 
1991 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .769** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .002 
N 12 12 
Police Officers Killed 
(1986-1990) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.769** 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .002 . 
N 12 12 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
2017   |   The South Asianist 5 (1): 249-281   |   pg. 269 
T-4: Correlation results 
 
Born in Pakistan 
pop, 1991 
Hard-core terrorists 
killed (1988-1990) 
Spearman's 
rho 
Born in Pakistan Pop, 
1991 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .587* 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .022 
N 12 12 
Hard-core Terrorists 
Killed (1988-1990) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.587* 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .022 . 
N 12 12 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
 
Analysis Summary 
The results demonstrate, categorically, that an extremely strong positive relation did 
exist, during the period corresponding with the rise of the Khalistan movement, 
between the two variables concerned: with results between ‘Born in Pakistan’ data 
(from both 1981 and 1991 census) and militancy figures (from both Punjab Police and 
SATP datasets) ending at the end of 1990, ranging from between +0.587 at the low end 
and an emphatic +0.853 on the high. 
As such, districts with higher rates of refugee population presence—such as 
Amritsar49 (which held 11.98 per cent and 9.88 per cent of the total pan-Punjab ‘Born 
in (which held 2.40 per cent and 2.30 per cent of the total pan-Punjab ‘Born in 
Pakistan’ population for 1981 and 1991 respectively), Bathinda (which held 1.98 per 
cent and 1.93 per cent of the total pan-Punjab ‘Born in Pakistan’ population for 1981 
and 1991 respectively) and Ropar (Rupnagar) (which held 2.00 per cent and 2.68 per 
cent of the total pan-Punjab ‘Born in Pakistan’ population for 1981 and 1991 
respectively)—had the lowest levels of militancy. The combined percentage of these 
three districts for ‘hard-core terrorists killed in Punjab’ totalled a meagre 5.18 per cent.  
                                                
49 In the case of Amritsar, the militancy rates were far higher than one would expect based on the 1981 
and 1991 ‘Born in Pakistan’ figures alone. The reason being that these figures do not convey the ‘true’ 
refugee impact that befell this district—since Amritsar city, being situated along the Grand Trunk Road, 
served as more of a transit route rather than a place of permanent settlement for the bulk of Sikh refugees 
from west Punjab and other parts of West Pakistan. As such the potential extent for the diffusion process 
to take place in the immediate aftermath of Partition would have been considerable, and undoubtedly 
such appropriated memories remained in the minds of their non-refugee ethnic kin throughout the 
Khalistan movement. http://punjabpolice.gov.in/Martyrgallery.aspx 
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Conclusion 
On the basis of the above discussion it is clear that Sikh refugees, and their post-event 
offspring, have re-territorialised their persecuted identity, and have done so through 
both lower-level and wider-level forms of expression. More fascinating however, is the 
evidence that supports the view that Sikh refugees, through engagement in this re-
territorialisation process, contributed toward the rise of ethno-national conflict in Indian 
Punjab, be it in the immediate aftermath of Partition against the Muslims, or against the 
Hindus and Indian nation-state since then, such as during the Khalistan movement. This 
contribution was made by either serving a lead-role or, at least, significantly increasing 
the conflict potential behind Sikh ethno-nationalist demands which were zero-sum in 
nature. However, it must be stressed that ‘contributing towards’ ethno-national conflict, 
and ‘serving as direct combatants’ of ethno-national conflict, are not one and the same. 
In fact, even with the results of the statistical analysis, it cannot be concluded that 
refugees, or for that matter their post-event offspring, were more likely to engage in 
ethno-national conflict than non-refugee Sikhs. Rather, it is more accurate to say that 
the districts where refugees settled tended to produce higher rates of ethno-national 
conflict—with the Khalistan militancy being a case-in-point.  
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Map 4 Administrative boundaries of Punjab, 1981 
 
 
Area 
(Sq./Km)  
     
PUNJAB 50362.00  
     
Gurdaspur (1) 3562.00  
     
Amritsar (2) 5087.00  
     
Firozpur (3) 5874.00  
     
Ludhiana (4) 3857.00  
     
Jalandhar (5) 3401.00  
     
Kapurthala (6) 1633.00  
     
Hoshiarpur (7) 3881.00  
     
Ropar (8) 2085.00  
     
Patiala (9) 4584.00  
     
Sangrur (10) 5107.00  
     
Bhatinda (11) 5551.00  
     
Faridkot (12) 5740.00  
 
Source: Census of India 1981: 25-33 
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Map 5 Administrative boundaries of Punjab, 1991 
 
 
Area 
(Sq./Km)  
     
PUNJAB 50362.00  
     
Gurdaspur (1) 3562.00  
     
Amritsar (2) 5087.00  
     
Firozpur (3) 5874.00  
     
Ludhiana (4) 3857.00  
     
Jalandhar (5) 3401.00  
     
Kapurthala (6) 1633.00  
     
Hoshiarpur (7) 3881.00  
     
Rupnagar (8) 2085.00  
     
Patiala (9) 4584.00  
     
Sangrur (10) 5107.00  
     
Bhatinda (11) 5551.00  
     
Faridkot (12) 5740.00  
 
Source: Census of India 1991: 22-39 
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Map 6 Born in Pakistan, 1981 (% of state-level born in Pakistan population) 
 
 
n % of state-level 
  
born in Pak. Pop. 1981 
      
PUNJAB 852,611 
       
Gurdaspur 137,171 16.09% 
      
Amritsar 102,127 11.98% 
      
Firozpur 123,122 14.44% 
      
Ludhiana 91,720 10.76% 
      
Jalandhar 116,582 13.67% 
      
Kapurthala 38,725 4.54% 
      
Hoshiarpur 55,621 6.52% 
      
Rupnagar 17,032 2.00% 
      
Patiala 94,111 11.04% 
      
Sangrur 20,505 2.40% 
      
Bathinda 16,866 1.98% 
      
Faridkot 39,029 4.58% 
 
Source: Census of India 1981a: 46-110 
20% +
15 - 19.99%
10 - 14.99%
5 - 9.99%
0 - 4.99%
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Map 7 Born in Pakistan, 1991 (% of state-level born in Pakistan population) 
 
 
n % of state-level 
  
born in Pak. pop. 1991 
      
PUNJAB 528,452 
       
Gurdaspur 67,990 12.87% 
      
Amritsar 52,200 9.88% 
      
Firozpur 79,728 15.09% 
      
Ludhiana 64,716 12.25% 
      
Jalandhar 77,996 14.76% 
      
Kapurthala 24,313 4.60% 
      
Hoshiarpur 37,041 7.01% 
      
Rupnagar 14,174 2.68% 
      
Patiala 64,370 12.18% 
      
Sangrur 12,130 2.30% 
      
Bathinda 10,180 1.93% 
      
Faridkot 23,614 4.47% 
 
Source: Census of India 1991a: 30-159
20% +
15 - 19.99%
10 - 14.99%
5 - 9.99%
0 - 4.99%
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Map 8 Police officers martyred in Punjab 1986-1990 
 
  n % of state-level police 
    officers martyred pop. 
      
PUNJAB 553   
      
Gurdaspur 84 15.19% 
      
Amritsar 207 37.43% 
      
Firozpur 34 6.15% 
      
Ludhiana 43 7.78% 
      
Jalandhar 51 9.22% 
      
Kapurthala 12 2.17% 
      
Hoshiarpur 18 3.25% 
      
Rupnagar 22 3.98% 
      
Patiala 31 5.61% 
      
Sangrur 14 2.53% 
      
Bathinda 11 1.99% 
      
Faridkot 26 4.70% 
 
Source: Punjab Police 2011 
12% +
9 - 11.99%
6 - 8.99%
3 - 5.99%
0 - 2.99%
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Map 9 Hard-core terrorists killed in Punjab 1988-1990 
 
 
n % of state-level hard-core 
  
terrorists killed Pop. 
      
PUNJAB 251 
       
Gurdaspur 33 13.15% 
      
Amritsar 78 31.08% 
      
Firozpur 19 7.57% 
      
Ludhiana 14 5.58% 
      
Jalandhar 22 8.76% 
      
Kapurthala 15 5.98% 
      
Hoshiarpur 16 6.37% 
      
Rupnagar 7 2.79% 
      
Patiala 9 3.59% 
      
Sangrur 1 0.40% 
      
Bathinda 5 1.99% 
      
Faridkot 32 12.75% 
 
Source: SATP 2001a
12% +
9 - 11.99%
6 - 8.99%
3 - 5.99%
0 - 2.99%
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